Under Section 9 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO), it would be an offence for Mr Wong (an employee), without the approval of his employer, to accept advantages (i.e. RMB575,000 illegal kickback from the two manufacturers) for placing more production orders with the two manufacturers. The offeror of the bribe would also be guilty of the offence. It shall be an offence under POBO if any act of bribery (includes promising, agreeing, soliciting or accepting advantages without permission) takes place in Hong Kong. By depositing the bribe money back into the bank account in Hong Kong, Mr. Wong might still violate the POBO. 

Mr Wong’s close relationship with the manufacturers had affected his objectivity when discharging his official duties. Though entertainment is an acceptable form of business behaviour, many past cases have shown that small favours such as free meals and small gifts etc. always breed corruption. It is therefore important for business manager to remind their staff of the need to handle their relationships with care, and to avoid accepting excessively frequent or lavish entertainment from them. 

Furthermore, business organisations should also establish clear policies on acceptance of advantage and declaration of conflicts of interest, and inform their suppliers or subcontractors of such policies. In the event that staff have violated the law or company policies, prompt action should be taken to report the case immediately.

In Hong Kong, according to the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO), it is an offence for any agent (generally the employee), without the permission of his principal (generally the employer), to solicit or accept an advantage as a reward for doing an act on relation to his principal’s business. Moreover, if any part of the bribery act takes place in Hong Kong, it shall still be an offence under the POBO. Although Chung was one of the shareholders of the enterprise, he was still an agent as defined by the law. He therefore must seek approval from the company before accepting any advantages. 

Business organisations should take the initiative to govern the acceptance of advantages by all levels of staff (including directors) in relation to company businesses. The company should state clearly amounts of advantage that the staff are permitted to accept, and conditions of such acceptance. The policy should also list out the declaration procedures and enquiry channels for staff compliance. 

Moreover, the company should establish detailed procurement procedures in order to ensure that the products purchased are of good quality and to prevent staff from abusing their authority or engaging in corrupt practices in the purchasing process. Staff should be reminded constantly of the importance of selecting suppliers in a fair and impartial manner.

Facing keen competition in the industry and pressure to secure loan business in the bank, a bank staff may cross the line. Over reliance on sales staff to provide borrowers’ information without counter checks would increase the risk of manipulation. 

The Sales Executive, an employee (agent) of the finance company (the principal), intended to deceive/mislead the company by using invoices which contained false information. Notwithstanding he did not receive any bribes, he might have contravened Section 9(3) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO). 

The Sales Executive, machine supplier and SME owners could be charged with fraud against the finance company, or conspiracy to defraud the finance company. 

The Sales Executive rationalized his acts by regarding his practice as helping the finance company to secure more loan business, at the same time helping the SMEs to overcome difficult situations. However, the fact that customers had to obtain higher loans through a fraudulent means suggested that they are high risk customers. Granting them higher loans increased the risk exposure of the finance company. 

Approving a higher loan based on inflated collateral value or bogus transactions might also result in an unusual increase in bad debt cases, and internal review by the finance company would detect the irregularity involved. 

Banks should adopt good control practices such as setting up a central team to conduct vigilant due diligence on high credit risk customers, conducting independent assessment of machine suppliers involved in HP transactions to ascertain their reliability, gauging reasonableness of the sales prices on invoice, and conducting regular assurance check to detect irregularities/unusual trend.

Nearly all bank staff members who misuse customers’ funds believe that such action is only temporary and can be rectified shortly. However, crime is committed once the funds are misused and such action cannot be ‘rectified’ even if the funds are ‘repaid’ before the crime comes into light. In this case study, the relationship manager (an agent) might have violated Section 9(3) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) by using forged documents to deceive his bank (the principal) in approving an increase in Client A’s credit limit and Client A’s fraudulent new loan. Also, the relationship manger could be liable for a series of other crimes including theft (transferring money from client’s account to his own), fraud and forgery. 

From the perspectives of customer service, it may be desirable for a relationship manager to provide personal service and act as the bank’s single point of contact for important clients. However, if all verification/clarification of questionable or doubtful transactions are routed through the relationship manager, it will undermine checks and balances and create opportunities for manipulations by unscrupulous relationship manager. 

Moreover, banks should adopt good control practices to remind supervisors to stay vigilant to potential risk of corrupt practices and make thorough enquiries into any suspected irregularities.

In this case study, the project manager, an employee (agent) of the bank (the principal), accepted an advantage from the Mainland contractor, as a reward for making a recommendation to the bank’s head office in Hong Kong to accept the contractor's substandard works and employ the same contractor to renovate other branches (an act in relation to the bank’s business and took place in Hong Kong), might contravene Section 9(1) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO). The Mainland contractor might also contravene Section 9(2) of the POBO for offering bribes. If any part of the act of bribery (including offering, soliciting or accepting a bribe) takes place in Hong Kong, it may still be pursued by the ICAC under the POBO. 

Procurement of goods and services is one of the most corruption-prone business processes, in particular those involving high values or specialist knowledge and specialised products or services, e.g. renovation and maintenance works. 

It is common for banks to send staff members to work in the Mainland office. The staff members are exposed to significant risk of temptation due to their perceived remoteness from the main office in Hong Kong and the absence of supervisory control measures. Relying on a single staff member, who is a specialist, without effective checks and balances and segregation of duties, also increases the corruption risk. 

Banks should lay down guidelines for key procurement stages. They should also assign supervisors to conduct site inspections to ensure compliance with the laid down guidelines and to detect malpractice, such as connivance of substandard performance of contractors. It is also important to circulate the staff code of conduct regularly to remind staff members to refrain from accepting frequent/lavish entertainment from contractors/suppliers which may otherwise affect one’s objective commercial judgment. In addition, it is also advisable to communicate to suppliers/contractors, in particular non-local ones, on the bank’s policy regarding anti-bribery, acceptance of advantages/entertainment, zero tolerance to corruption and channel(s) for feedback/enquiry.

The bank manager, an employee (agent) of the bank (the principal) and without the permission of the bank, accepted advantage from the client as a reward for helping the latter to perform suspicious transactions through the bank (an act in relation to bank’s business). The bank manager might contravene Section 9(1) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) for accepting bribes, while the client might contravene Section 9(2) of the same Ordinance for offering bribes. 

The bank manager might breach the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance or the Drug Trafficking (Recovery of Proceeds) Ordinance as well as the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Ordinance if he, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that any property which, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly represents any person’s proceeds of drug trafficking or indictable offence, deals with that property. 

Money laundering is a serious crime. Banks should make all staff members aware that the bank must comply with the laws and would constantly monitor fund transfers and audit the related control/processes, so as to provide a deterrent.

In this case, the senior credit manager, an employee (agent) of the bank (the principal), without the permission from the bank, accepted an advantage (a watch) from factory owner as a reward for turning a blind eye to the out-dated equipment and giving him a favourable site inspection report (an act in relation to the bank’s business). Although the acceptance of gifts took place outside Hong Kong, part of the bribery act occurred in Hong Kong (e.g. submission of a favourable report to the bank). The senior credit manager might breach Section 9(1) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) for accepting bribes, whereas the factory owner might contravene Section 9(2) of the POBO for offering bribes. The senior credit manager might have also contravened the Banking Ordinance. 

Although the senior credit manager was the supervisor of the credit manager, he did not have the authority to permit his subordinates to accept the advantage. 

It is very common for banks’ corporate clients to have their business operations such as production plants or other assets in the Mainland or elsewhere outside Hong Kong. When site inspection/ visit by bank staff is required in assessing a loan application, the staff members are exposed to significant risk of temptation, which may comprise bribes, gifts, and excessive entertainment or services. 

In fact, assigning staff members of the same unit (in particular one of them is the supervisor of the other one) to conduct high corruption-risk tasks is a formula of disaster. The credit manager did not decline the gift offer at the spot probably because of the pressure from his supervisor, and might eventually be tempted to collude with his supervisor. 

Due to the differences in various cultures, some customers from other regions may regard offering gifts/ rewards in return for assistance or favour as a common business practice. Banks should make it clear to their staff members that it is unnecessary and inappropriate for bank staff members to adopt local cultures which may violate the laws. Moreover, an independent, reliable and confidential channel of reporting malpractices should be established by banks to encourage whistle-blowing. Furthermore, it is essential for banks to communicate clearly to all staff members and customers, especially non-local ones, about the bank’s policies on anti-bribery, acceptance of advantages / entertainment and zero tolerance to corruption.

In this case, the relationship manager, an employee (agent) of the bank (the principal), without the permission of the bank, accepted monetary bonuses (advantages) from the acquainted client as a reward for his preferential service in managing the investment portfolio (an act in relation to the bank’s business). The relationship manager might violate Section 9(1) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) for accepting bribes; whereas the acquainted client might contravene Section 9(2) of the POBO for offering bribes. 

The personal relationship between the relationship manager and the acquainted client would give rise to conflict of interest, which was conducive to favouritism towards the customer, e.g. providing first priority in the investment portfolio management. 

To prevent corruption and malpractices, banks should enhance the awareness of integrity among staff members and promote ethical culture by: 

• disseminating a clear message by top management on commitment to business ethics and integrity, and zero-tolerance to unethical practices; 
• specifying the integrity standard expected of all staff members in a Code of Conduct, in particular, the restrictions on acceptance of advantages from bank customers, and the requirement for staff to declare and avoid conflict of interest. 

It is also necessary to conduct regular (induction, refresher) staff trainings on integrity and anti-corruption and to communicate with customers, including non-local customers, about the bank’s policies on anti-bribery and acceptance of advantages policy.

The relationship manager (agent) might have contravened Section 9(3) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) by using a false document (forged customer instruction) to deceive the bank (the principal). He might also be liable of a series of other crimes including theft, fraud and forgery. 

Some elderly customers may be vulnerable to exploitation as they may trust bank staff members (e.g. the relationship manager) to execute transactions on their behalves (e.g. signing blank instruction forms or giving their e-banking passwords) so as to save physical visits to the bank. 

The practice of keeping account advices for customers to collect later on is vulnerable to falsification or concealing irregularities. 

Furthermore, inactive, dormant accounts with a large balance or credit line are subject to the risk of exploitation, as the account owners may not monitor their accounts properly or may have changed addresses without informing the bank. 

Banks should devise control measures to protect dormant accounts from possible abuse and to avoid fraud. These control measures may include alerts on unusual fund movements, verification and confirmation with the customers, requirements for supervisors’ review/ override for transactions on inactive accounts, and requirements for identification of account holder when making withdrawals in person. Moreover, implementing requirements for staff members to take annual vacation leave, arranging and introducing a backup/ second officer to vulnerable customers, and practising staff rotation (say, on a three-year basis) may also help detect irregularities and misconduct at an early stage.

Under Section 9(1) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO), it might be an offence for the senior bank manager (i.e. an agent, as an employee of the bank), without the permission of his principal (i.e. the bank), to accept advantages (i.e. expensive gifts offered by the client) as rewards for assisting the client to secure extension of loan repayment. The client might also violate Section 9(2) of POBO for offering bribes. 

The senior bank manager might have also contravened Section 124 of the Banking Ordinance which prohibits any employee of an authorized institution to receive any gift, commission, advantage etc. for his own personal benefit, for procuring or endeavouring to procure for any person any advance, loan, financial guarantee or credit facility from that institution. 

For efficiency purpose, bank managers are often delegated with authorities to endorse certain loan-related applications up to certain limits. The risk of corruption is in proportion to the discretion which bank managers are allowed to exercise. The greater the discretion, the higher the corruption risk. 

The restructuring of distressed loans is a corruption-prone area which is easily overlooked. A desperate debtor could entice the bank manager to secure favourable credit terms, e.g. extension of credit facilities. 

Corruption in the lending function will result in an increase in bad loans, affecting the bank’s business and profitability. When a customer is willing to bribe for favour in credit approval, it reflects both the underlying financial problems of his business and his poor integrity. His chance of defaulting repayment will be high. An internal review of the case will unearth the impropriety and corruption dealing. With a stringent control mechanism of a bank and a whistle-blowing mechanism, there is a good chance that the corrupt dealings will be detected.